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l.'l THE SUPRE\IE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BLAINE BARNARD, * 
Plaintiff and Appellant, * 
vs. * Supreme Court 
* No. 19 08 0 
RUTH D. BARNARD and 
P.'1.UL D. BARNARD, * 
Defendants and Respondents. * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for specific performance wherein 
Plaintiff-Appellant sought enforcement of an oral contract 
between Plaintiff-Appellant as buyer and Defendant-Respondent, 
Ruth D. Barnard as seller of two acres of real estate located 
in Box Elder County, Utah. 
DISPOS lTION IN LOWER COURT 
After non-jury trial on the merits, the trial court held 
that the contract was unenforceable, and ordered Defendant-
Respondent, Ruth D. Barnard, to return the $6,000 purchase 
price to Plaintiff-Appellant. The trial court also declared 
unenforccnhle a warranty deed from Defendant-Respondent, Ruth 
U. llarnHrd, to Defendant-Respondent, Paul D. Barnard, and 
quieted title to the property in favor of Defendant-Respondent, 
l{utl1 iJ. ilarnard. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF PAGE 2 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's 
de t e rm i n at i on that the con t r a c t was u n en f o r c ea b l e and r erna n d 
with instructions to find the eastern boundary of the real 
estate to be conveyed and order specific performance of the 
contract. 
STATE:.IENT OF FACTS 
As of September 3, 1976, Defendant-Respondent, Ruth D. 
Barnard (hereinafter "Ruth") was the owner in fee simple 
absolute of the tract of land (hereinafter "total tract") more 
particularly described on APPENDIX A (R. 82). On September 3, 
1 9 7 6 , Ru th executed a War ran t y Deed t o the tot a 1 t r a c t i n favor 
of her son, Defendant-Respondent, Paul D. Barnard (hereinafter 
"Paul"), which deed was in the nature of a testamentary 
diposition and was not recorded until 1979 (R. 83, 85). On 
September 25, 1978, Ruth entered into a contract (hereinafter 
"the contract") with another son, Plaintiff-Appellant 
(hereinafter "Blaine") whereby Ruth was to convey two acres 
(hereinafter "the two acre parcel") of the total tract to 
Blaine, reserving a life estate in Ruth, in exchange for $6,000 
(R. 83, 84). On September 25, 1978 Blaine paid the $6,000 
p u ch as e p r i c e t o Ru t h ( R. 8 4 ) • On Ap r i 1 .) , 1 9 7 9 , !{u t 11 :; a v e 
Blaine a receipt for the $6,000 (R. 19). Pr i o r t o \p l' i I I ti , 
1g7 9, Ru th threatened to s e 1 1 the proper t v , and llu th and '\! ·1 i n e 
had a disagreement after ·Nl1icil l{ut:1 tenrlercd $ti, t" Ill "ne 
who refused to tender (IL 84, 11). I )11 \pr I '' 
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The relevant configuration of land and ownership at the 
t i me o f the con t r a c t i s rough, as s e t f o r th i n AP PEND IX B 
(R. 83, Disposition, Appendix I). The two 
acre parcel was to border on Blaine's property, the Allen 
property and the Church's north boundary (R. 84). The 
remaining boundaries, specifically the east boundary, was not 
indicated (R. 84). In 1981, Blaine had a surveyor prepare a 
legal description of two acres of land within the total tract, 
which is contained on APPENDIX C, without consulting Ruth 
( R. 8 5). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE 1WO ACRE PARCEL WAS SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBED SO AS TO 
RENDER THE CONTRACT ENFORCEABLE 
The trial court, in it's capacity of finder of fact, 
identified the tract of land out of which the two acre parcel 
was to have been "carved" and at least three of the boundaries 
of the parcel, but had specific difficulty in fixing the 
eastern boundary of the land to be conveyed. The question 
presented is whether such identification of the subject parcel 
as was made by the finder of fact was sufficient, as a matter 
of law anrl equity, to support a decree of specific performance. 
performance is an equitable remedy, and the 
revir".l'i ng ('ourt may therefore exercise a broad scope of review 
ilil P.2cl 1:;7-1, 1377 (Utah, 1980). In actions for specific 
'."'l't rir''l1'tl1<'•?. tl1e terms of the contract must be certain so that 
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the Co u r t can car r y out t he i n t en t o f t he pa r t i es , bu t w i th 
regard to the certainty of descriptions of real estate, 
reasonable certainty is all that is required 
and if the description of land is sufficiently 
certain to enable the land to be located and 
examined, it is sufficient to justify specific 
performance of the contract." 71 Am Jur, Specific 
Per f o rma nc e § 1 1 7 at 14 9. 
This principle, as applied to descriptions of land, sterns 
from the more comprehensive maxim "in equity that is certain 
which can be made certain." 
(Utah, 1980). 
In the present case, then, if the two acre parcel can be 
so i dent i f i e d a s t o be 1 o ca t e d and ex am i n e d , then i t i s 
sufficiently certain to warrant the remedy of specific 
per f o rma nc e. 
I n , 2 0 2 P • 2 d 7 1 4 ( U t a h , 1 9 4 9 ) , t h i s Co u r t 
considered the question of the enforceability of a contract for 
the sale of land .vilere the adequacy of the descrif)tion was 
challenged. In holding that reference to "certain leased land 
up in the old field, now under fence above the Spring Branch 
Ditch" was sufficiently definite to render the contract 
enforceable, this Court explained: 
"The onlv reasonable rneans bv which a person can 
describe-property located on a p1Jl1!1c domain, cinc1 
which has never been surveyed, is hy referenee to 
n at u al monument s . The or i q; i n a I p" rt 1 es t ) t Ii<' 
contract could not hctve desc1·1i"''i tl1e land bv 111ct•'.s 
and hounds without going to till' of runr1111c; a 
survey . " IJ I'. d 7 I I a t 7 I ( l' t 1 11. 
l 97 g) • 
·d. 
A. n d t he 0 n l v <1 v t 1-1 e r· n Pt' r' t · ( · ' 1 1 i : 1' I' I )\' 1 
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reference to which "corner" of the total tract the two acre 
parcel was located in. They apparently agreed upon the 
Northwest corner as the trial court's findings pointed out by 
finding boundaries of the two acres in the northwestern portion 
of Ruth's property. 
This Court held that a contract for the sale of a small 
tract of land which was part of a larger tract was specifically 
enforceable in spite of the lack of a legal description for the 
sma 1 1 er "car v e d o u t " tr a c t i n 5 8 9 P. 2 d 1 2 1 9 
(Utah, 1979). the parties entered into a contract 
to sell and purchase forty acres of land, a description of 
which was supposed to have been attached to the contract, and 
additional ten acres on which two houses were located. The 
lower court received parol evidence but ruled that the contract 
was unenforceable. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded 
with instructions to "decide what was the legal description of 
the land included in the agreement to purchase." 589 
P. 2 d 1 2 2 J. The Sup re me Co u r t s tat e d that the 1 o cat i on of the 
ten acres was clear, that the location of a portion of the 
forty acres was clear (all land on south of freeway except 40 
a c re s o f fenced ground ) . 5 8 9 P. 2 d 1 2 2 !. Apparent 1 y , 
the '.vas not informed as to the amount of acreage to be 
conveveJ over and above what had been "clearly" identified, but 
n0n<'th,,le'' instructed the lower court to decide on the legal 
1je :_; (._' r i rt 1 () n. 
J,, tl1c 1Hesent case, us the seller was to 
:i: 1 v,• ''<·1rv<'d out" of a large tract of land, a smaller parcel 
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for the buyer. The general location of the smaller parcel 
within the tract was known to and understood by the parties, 
even though the details of the boundaries were not described by 
metes and bounds. holding went further in fixing 
the location of land in that a portion of the forty acres of 
land to be conveyed was not even generally fixed within the 
larger tract. In the present ease, the location of the two 
acres was generally fixed at the northwest portion of Ruth's 
property. In fact, three boundaries were found by the Court in 
the present ease. 
ap p 1 i e d to the present ease and the c 1 o s e d ex am in at ion of the 
facts in each case, dictate a reversal of the trial court's 
erroneous conclusion that the location of the tract to be 
conveyed was too indefinite. 
The two acres was sufficiently identified so as to sustain 
a specific perfonnanee decree since the total acreHge to be 
conveyed was specified, the tract out of which the WH' 
to be "carved" was identified and the location of the proµcrtv 
'Nithin the tract was generally fixed nnd speeif1c1illv loc:1tcd 
as to three boundaries. 
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POINT II --------
SPECIFIC PERFOR:'.IANCE OF THE CONTRACT IS DICTATED UNDER 
RULES OF EQUITY 
Even if the identity of the land were uncertain or vague 
or ambiguous, the contract would be enforceable via specific 
performance. Ruth, by her words and actions, demonstrated her 
understanding that a two acre parcel in the northwest corner of 
her tract of land had been sold to Blaine, and Ruth should not 
be allowed to avoid the consequences of her manifested intent 
with regard to the contract on the basis of a claimed 
deficiency in the contract. 
The general rule in this regard is well expressed in 28 Am 
Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 59 at 677: 
"Estoppel is frequently based upon the acceptance 
and retention, by one having knowledge or notice of 
the facts, of benefits from a transaction. . which 
he might have rejected or contested." 
In cases such as the present one: 
"The estoppel is also appied 
with a knowledge, 
· 
28 _-\m Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver§ 59 at 679 (emphasis added). 
I ri , 2 0 2 P • 2 d 7 I 4 ( U t ah , 1 9 4 9 ) , t h e 
Plaintiff (in position of vendor) asserted that the contract of 
Si!le wns too ambi;;uous to be enforceable. The Court struck 
down tl1e Plaintiff's contentions, and while admitting that the 
had "infirmities," ruled: 
"\Ve have a written instrument which is attacked 
bccRuse of uncertainties of ambiguities. We are of 
t 11 c opinion that 
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To hold otherwise would permit the 
statute of frauds to be used by him as a shield to 
defeat what appears to be a just and equitable cause 
against him." 
In the present instance, the facts bear out a strong case 
for invocation of the equitable principle of estoppel against 
Ruth with regard to the claimed insufficiency of description 01 
the two acres. Ruth agreed to sell _two acres and identified at 
least the general location of the two acres within her larger 
tract. On the same day, she accepted $6,000 cash 
She d i d not i n f o rm B 1 a i n e at that t i me or there a f t er 
that in 1976 she had executed and delivered to Paul a Warranty 
Deed t o her en t i re t r a c t of 1 and ( St at eme n t o f Fa c t s , a 1 so 
R. 17, 21). In April of 1979, Ruth gave Blaine a written 
receipt for the $5,000 purchase price. Later that man th, Ruth 
had a disagreement with Blaine, and on April 13, the Warranty 
Deed to Paul was finally recorded (Statement of Facts). Even 
after the suit had comnenced, Ruth referred to contract as one 
she considered was binding on Blaine (R. 1 9) • The course of 
Ruth's conduct and actions clearly es top her from claiming the 
description of the land to be too ambiguous so as t 0 be 
enforceable. To hold otherwise woulrl allow Ruth to keep the 
full purchase price until she felt it was convenient or 
profitable for her to return it, while in the meantime, lead i r 
Blaine to believe that he had R contract. If t 11 e ,; al c 
had been for a fee si1nple interest, cnuld l111v1' ' 1 l'•'l1 
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expected to enter into the property and possess it inrnediately 
after payment of the $6,000. But since Ruth had sold only a 
remainder interest, Blaine understood that he was not to 
presently assume possession. Blaine's inability to assume 
possession facilitated Ruth's apparent objective to "play 
favorites" among her children by failing to execute a deed to 
Blaine. A reversal of the trial court's ruling is the only 
method by which Ruth can be prevented from profiting by her 
inequitable conduct with respect to Blaine. As stated in 
, 5 8 9 P • 2 d 1 2 1 9 , 1 2 2 1 ( U t ah , 1 9 7 9 ) : 
"This Court takes judicial knowledge of the fact that 
land values in the area have increased greatly since 
the contract was made. 
.. the seller 
could hope for a mighty windfall by selling if at its 
enhanced value to others." (emphasis added) 
Equity dictates that the contract be enforced against 
Ruth, "lho accepted the ful 1 purchase price for the land, and in 
favor of Blaine, who in good faith paid the price and believed 
he had a contract. There is no evidence on the record of any 
dispute regarding the location and extent of the land to be 
conveyed until Defendants filed their answer. 
'il5 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah, 1980). It is now asserted as a 
convenient device to deprive Blaine of the benefit of his 
bargai'l. lcq u i t y s ho u l d no t to 1 er at e such an e f fort. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in holding that the contract in 
1inenforceable because l) the land to be conveyed was identified 
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by amount of acreage, location within the tract and at least 
three boundries, and 2) Ruth is estopped from asserting any 
technical deficiency in the contract. This Court should 
therefore do equity by reversing the trial court's decision to 
deny specific perfonnance and by remanding with instructions to 
"decide what was the legal description of the land" in 
a cc o rd a n c e w i t h , 5 8 9 P . 2 d 1 2 1 9 ( U t a h , 1 9 7 9 . 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of July, 1983. 
CERTIFICATE OF \!AILING 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of July, 1983, 
mailed, postage prepaid two (2) copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF to: 
Da v i d B • Ha v a s 
HAVAS AND HAVAS 
Suite 216 Harrison Place 
3293 Harrison Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 8-±403 
-------------
Beginning at Northwest Corner of Northeast Quarter of 
Section 2 T. 8 N. R. 2 W. SLM, thence South 268 feet, 
thence South 70°07' E. 420 ft., more or less, to West 
line of State Highway, thence North 32°1 1 East along 
said line 625.6 feet, thence North 67°31 '40" West 566.56 
feet, thence S. 23°28' W. l':i5.2 ft., th. N. 67°31'40" 
w. 256.3 ft., th. s. 21°46'30" w. 485.6 ft., th. s. 
69°45 1 15 11 E. 308.7 ft., th. N. 1°26' w. 261 ft to the pt. 
of beg. EXCEPTING therefrom the following described 
tracts: 
Beg. at a pt. located N. 341.26 ft. and E. 195.68 
ft. from SW cor. of SE quarter of said Sec. 2, said pt. 
being on Grantor's N. property line, th. S. 23°28' 
134.2 ft., th. S. 67°31'40" E. 40.0 ft., th. N. 23°28' 
E. 134.2 rt: to said N. line, th. N. 67°31'40" w. 40.0 
ft. along said N. line to pt. of beg. 
Beg. at a pt. which is 280 ft. N. and N. 67°31'40" 
W. 95 ft., more or less, from SE cor. of SW quarter of 
Sec. 35 T. 9 N. R. 2 W. SLM which pt. is on the E. line 
of the County Road, and running th. S. 21°46'30" W. 95 
ft., along said road; th. S. 67°31 '40" E. 185 ft., th. 
N. 21°46 1 30 11 E. 95 ft., th. N. 67°31'40" W. 185 ft to pt. 
of beg. 
Beg. at a pt. N. 31°20 1 E. 245.6 ft. and N. 66°58' 
W. 256.5 ft. from SW cor. of SE quarter of ,Sec. 35 T. 
N. R. 2 W. SLM, th. N. 22°25' E. 21.0 ft., th. S. 66°58' 
E. 201.0 ft., th. S. 21°46'30" W. 21.0 ft., th. N. 66°5,q• 
W. 201.24 ft to the pt. of beg. 
Beg. at a pt. S. 1°26' E. 261 ft. and N. 69°45'15" 
W. 308.7 ft. from NW cor. of NE quarter of Sec. 2 T. 8 
N.R. 2 W. SLM, an existing fence corner of record, said 
point being s. 162.0 ft. and W. 2936.76 ft. from NE cor. 
of said Sec. 2, thence N. 21°46'30" E. 390.6 ft., thence 
S. 67°35'50 11 E. 345.4 ft., th. S. 23°18 1 15 11 W. 378.0 
ft., th. N. 69°45'15" W. 335.41 ft to pt. of beg. 
Beg. at a pt. N. 31°21' E. 245.6 ft. from SW corner 
of SE quarter of Sec. 35 T. 9 N. R. 2 W. SLM, th. N. 
24°02' E. 21 ft., thence N. 66°58' West 55.5 ft., thence 
S. 22°25' W. 21 ft., th. S. 66°58' E. 55.26 ft. to the 
pt.of beg. 
Together with all water rights and improvements belonging 
thereto. 
QO)t 1• 6L6 
;.I /NAuSTArF c. 
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02·01 P-OCr;;.;r 
PAGE 28 -(ESS AND.CR SON GREGOR.' J;TlfL 
1-\P pl_- re/JI A (_, 
Part of the SE Quarter of Section 35, T9N, R2W 
and part of the NE Quarter of Section 2, T8N, 
R2W SLB&M, beginning at a point located 157.38 
feet North and 47.92 feet East of the NW Corner of 
NE Quarter of said Section 2, thence N21°46'30"E 
71.22 feet, thence 567°31'40" E 64.43 feet, thence 
N23°28'E 21.00 feet, thence S67°31'40"E 40.00 feet, 
thence N23°28'E 134.2 feet to the grantor's North 
line, thence S67°31 '40"E 346.79 feet, thence 
S22°28'20"W 226.39 feet, thence N67°31'40"W 453.04 
feet to the point of beginning, containing 2.0 
acres. 
